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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as the UK's leader, he was the fifth British prime minister to take up the role in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this represented unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its fifth prime minister in two years – three of them in the past 10 months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for support from Socialist lawmakers as the price for his administration's continuation.

But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not witnessed for many years – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Essential context: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly split into three opposing factions – the left, far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

Simultaneously, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now almost twice the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he encountered anger from allies and opponents alike.

So much so that the following day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a respectful address, he blamed political intransigence, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it mildly, not without complications.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the end of his 48 hours, he went on TV to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Could he survive – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already supportive, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those votes, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be demanding further compromises. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

Changing Political Culture

The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR seek his removal.

To achieve that, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his replacement would disband the assembly and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But this also remains unclear.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a bygone phenomenon, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that transformation will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”